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T he philosophical works of Nishida KitarO (1870-1945) form a body of work that is singularly difficult to understand—indeed, it is 
not unusual to read for pages with almost no idea of what it is that 
Nishida is trying to say. Yet at the same time there is something in his 
work that presses itself upon one and keeps one reading. One can sense 
through his labored words and phrases the central nature of the prob­
lems he takes up, as well as the almost physical passion with which he 
struggles to resolve these problems. Writing for Nishida was not the 
setting down of already thought-out concepts, but was rather part of 
the thinking process itself. Nishida compared himself to a miner deep 
in the earth, swinging his pick in search of the gold-vein of truth. And 
his words were indeed like swings of the pick, sometimes dislodging a 
precious piece of truth-ore, sometimes chipping the pick itself. The 
rough, irregular fragments he extracted were linked together through 
sheer tenacity of thought and left to us in the form of his writings.
One cannot help feeling that there must be a reason for the difficulty 
of Nishida’s philosophical writings. His interpretations of other 
philosophers (as in Gendai ni okeru risO shugi no tetsugaku [Contem­
porary idealistic philosophy]) are both clear and to the point, and his 
personal essays are penned in a style that is lucid, simple, and vigorous. 
Why then do his thoughts become so labored when he turns to his 
philosophical treatises, the works that evoked from him his profoun- 
dest reflections? There are a number of reasons, no doubt, but the most 
fundamental may have been that many of the issues Nishida sought to
* This is a translation of the author’s “Nishida tetsugaku o yomu muzukashisa,” in 
Keiken to jikaku [Experience and Awakening] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1994), pp. 231—41. 
The essay in Japanese was originally published in the January 1993 issue o f Gendai 
shisO [Modem thought]. We wish to thank the author for permission to publish it here.
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clarify lay in philosophical territory hitherto unexplored, forcing him 
to operate in the absence of appropriate philosophical language. It was 
as though he had to create as he went along a syntax for a grammarless 
tongue, and the result was often what Nishida himself characterized as 
“ confused, jumbled thinking” (19:636). In his philosophical thought 
“ subjective logic” and “ predicative logic” —to use Nishida’s own ter­
minology—are entwined and interwoven, and visible, verifiable connec­
tions between one form and another are unexpectedly (and quite fre­
quently) severed by sudden changes of subject between one paragraph 
and another. One may discern three things at work here: 1) a tension aris­
ing from the encounter of differing traditions; 2) a certain lack of 
homogeneity in Nishida’s thought; 3) a primality and thoroughness in 
his inquiry, together with an exceptionally protracted development of 
ideas. Let us examine each of these features a bit more closely.
The Encounter o f  Different Traditions
Nishida’s philosophy took form at the historical moment when the 
problem of “ East and West” was emerging with a sometimes violent 
force. Nishida was on the one hand deeply rooted in the spiritual tradi­
tions of the East, and on the other profoundly influenced by the history 
and concerns of Western philosophical thought. The tension between 
the two distinct traditions formed the reality within which he strove to 
articulate his philosophy, but, as Nishida himself commented, “ it was 
an impossible task.” One might say that between the nonconceptual 
practice of the East and the reflective philosophy of the West—to take 
for the moment the extreme expressions of the respective traditions— 
there is a gap so fundamental as to be unbridgeable. Nishida, though 
sharing with his contemporary Natsume SOseki (1867-1916) the painful 
sensation of being pulled apart by the respective poles of East and 
West, nevertheless threw himself deliberately into the gap between the 
two, an act emblematic of his conviction that the East-West problem 
was a world-historical problem, one central to the success or failure of 
the effort to create a truly global world.
Unfortunately, the language that had evolved in the course of 
Western philosophical history did not allow Nishida to articulate and 
develop the ideas that took form in this tension-filled East-West gap. 
Even those thinkers that most influenced Nishida, like Aristotle, Hegel,
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and Leibniz, were decisively transformed at the core of his philosophy: 
“ that which is subject and cannot be predicate” became “ that which is 
predicate and cannot be subject,” the dialectic of process became the 
dialectic of place, and the monad became “ the monad that exists only 
in relation to other monads.”  There was no ready-made logic and ter­
minology for a form of thought that strove to reinterpret in terms of 
topos (basho) the substance at work in these transformations, nor for 
the philosophy that developed out of them. Nor was the language of 
the East any more capable of expressing the movement of Nishida’s 
thought. Suitable though it is for the delicate expression of the world 
of fundamental awakening (as when Nishida, after swiftly brushing an 
India-ink circle, wrote “ The circle of the heart-moon—its light swal­
lows the myriad things” ), it does not by nature lend itself to the articu­
lation of philosophical speculation. Nishida, “ confused and jumbled” 
though his thoughts may have been, devoted his entire philosophical 
career to the creation of a new logic. The reading of Nishida must thus 
be accompanied by an awakening to the East-West question that was 
so central to Nishida himself.
In truth, though, the fundamental issues addressed by Nishida are 
not defined solely by the boundaries of East and West. Nonconceptual 
practice is not something that is confined to Eastern tradition, nor is 
philosophy as an ever-deepening process of reflection something that is 
confined to Western tradition. Both relate to the overall potential of 
the human being in a global world. Although the East-West question 
provided for Nishida a historical “ place” for thought, it was the issue 
of human potential as expressed through nonconceptual practice and 
reflective philosophy that comprised the very material of his philoso­
phy. And it was the space that stretched between the two—a space 
characterized by a heterogeneity rooted in unresolved tension—that 
formed the space in which Nishida*s thought took form.
Heterogeneity
This lack of homogeneity in Nishida’s “ space of thought” is, I believe, 
the principal factor that makes his ideas so labored and his treatises so 
difficult to understand. An example is Nishida’s “ philosophy of pure 
experience,”  which appears at first glance to be relatively straightfor­
ward but which is in fact taut with an extraordinary internal strain and
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dissonance, especially between the expression of pure experience in its 
most primitive form ( “ at the moment of seeing a color or hearing a 
sound there is no subject or object” ) and the format of philosophical 
exposition adopted in Zen no kenkyQ (An Inquiry into the Good; 
1910).1 This philosophy attempts to “ explain everything” on the basis 
of the proposition that “ pure experience is the only reality,”  but this 
pure experience—being a primitive, immediate event—is not some­
thing that rests well in the formal confines of a philosophical proposi­
tion. If anything it acts to destroy such propositional forms.
Thus at the foundations of pure-experience philosophy there exists a 
elemental clash between the core proposition of the philosophy and a 
force that tends to dissolve this very proposition. There is, in other words, 
a jarring encounter of philosophy and that which is not philosophy. 
These forces continually relegate Nishida’s thought back to the wilder­
ness that lies between reflection and prereflection (a wilderness consist­
ing not of reflection or prereflection themselves but of a realization of 
pre-reflection based on a breaking through of reflection, so that an ele­
ment of this breakthrough is always present in reflection). In this wilder­
ness the very principles of thought are subject to a thorough reevalua­
tion. (Nishida, aware of the self-contradiction in these principles, later 
propounded the principle of the self-identity of contradictories.)
All of Nishida’s thought, including his concept of self-awareness, his 
notion of place, and the philosophy of his later years, is informed by this 
multidimensional, heterogeneous dynamic of prereflection, reflection, 
and the reflection of reflection. The asymmetry of this thought system, 
stretched as it is between the extremes of radically immediate prereflec­
tion on the one hand and rational reflection on the other, renders it just 
as unworkable as a physical movement that attempts to simultaneously 
fly in the sky, run on the ground, swim in the water, and dig in the 
ground. It is as though one attempted to perform Heiddeger’s Denken 
[thinking] and Dichten [poetizing] concurrently, with each infusing the 
other. It is little wonder that Nishida’s ideas proceeded so laboriously 
and his treatises became ever more obscure. If, however, we can see the 
movement of Nishida’s thought as an attempt to realize, through the 
impossibility of speculation, the nature of reality as reality, then the
1 Nishida’s first book, and the representative work o f pure-experience philosophy.
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reading of Nishida can become an occasion for perceiving that which 
thought should truly direct itself toward.
The Character o f  Nishida’s Thought
The intercultural tension and internal heterogeneity we have seen in 
Nishida’s thought placed him in the difficult position of having to 
rethink things from their very foundations. This meant a thorough­
going investigation into the origins of even those notions generally re­
garded as self-evident, such as the nature of things, of understanding, 
and of the self.
Nishida had a taste for immersing himself in especially difficult prob­
lems and struggling to dig himself out. He asks, for example, “ What is 
the meaning of ‘self-awareness*? Self-awareness is the knower knowing 
the known; one can say that in self-awareness the knower becomes one 
with that which is known.” So far we understand, or at least we think 
we understand. Then, with Nishida’s next question, “ But what is the 
meaning of Zrnowiwg?” , the ground of premises that had seemed so 
self-evident suddenly crumbles beneath us and we are off on an inquiry 
into the nature of knowledge, including such problems as how we can 
know that we know. The difficulty of dealing with such primal ques­
tions often steers Nishida’s reasoning into paths quite arduous to fol­
low.
Let us take up one more example. “ It is possible to doubt the exis­
tence of anything,” he says, “ but we cannot doubt the existence of the 
‘I’. Even if we claim to do so, it is ‘I’ who entertains the doubt. With 
us, to exist and to know are the same. Even the fact of doubting must 
mean that there is an ‘I’.”  We can easily follow Nishida’s Cartesian 
reflexes this far. But he is compelled to inquire further, asking “ What 
then is this ‘I’? ”  (7:85).
To read the philosophy of Nishida is thus to learn to question all 
things—including our own point of view—from the very source. In­
deed, this may be seen as the most fundamental element of the philo­
sophical quest.
The final element I have identified as contributing to the difficulty of 
Nishida’s thought is the extremely protracted nature of his discussions. 
Nishida, as can be seen in a book like Jikaku ni okeru chokkan to han­
sei (Intuition and Reflection in Self-awareness), would start a particu-
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lar work as an organized treatise, patch on one idea after another 
without any sense of system, attempt to reexpress things in a more or­
derly fashion but once again add new thoughts, try to extricate himself 
by reinterpreting what he had written, decide to change direction, and 
so on and so forth until he was left with a volume that is more like a 
long-continued series of articles than a single organized work. This pat­
tern characterizes every treatise in the more than five thousand pages of 
his Collected Works, so much so that one almost has to view these writ­
ings as parts of a single giant thesis that Nishida continued building 
upon throughout his life. Each treatise has a title of its own, but this 
simply indicates the focus of the work; the studies are concerned not so 
much with presenting a particular theme as they are with further de­
veloping an ongoing line of reasoning. Thus the serious student of any 
particular treatise must at the very least have read the preceding and 
succeeding treatises as well, and preferably all the treatises in the Col­
lected Works (patiently enduring the endless repetitions).
Much the same holds true for the distinctive terminology that one 
encounters in the respective writings. Such expressions as “ the self­
limitation of place” (basho no jiko gentei), “ active intuition” (kOiteki 
chokkan), and “ the historical body” (rekishiteki shintai)—as well as 
the famous “ self-identity of absolute contradictories”  (zettai mujun- 
teki jiko doitsu), which by itself sounds so formulaic, abstract, and 
assertive—can be fully understood only within the context of the full 
body of Nishida’s philosophical work. Unless one has a concrete 
knowledge of the developments in Nishida’s thought that produced a 
need for these particular expressions, they are of very little meaning.
All of this makes it necessary to read and reread Nishida’s work be­
fore it can be understood. Given the laborious nature of the individual 
pieces, this only adds to the overall difficulty of studying his thought. If 
one is able to read (as opposed to understand) Nishida’s work, it is 
only because the energy to do so is provided by a certain empathy with 
the issues that occupy Nishida himself. Without this empathy the read­
ing of Nishida is of little philosophical benefit. For this very reason it 
is a philosophy that inevitably attracts criticism from a variety of direc­
tions.
We have examined several of the reasons that Nishida’s philosophi­
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philosopher’s concerns, however, we discover that his works contain 
something in addition to difficult turns of phrase. As we work our way 
from one demanding page to the next, we find that, just as a pick sends 
off sparks that momentarily illuminate the dark mine shaft, Nishida 
here and there comes out with short comments that point to the mean­
ing of the entire work. “ Objects come and illuminate me”  (10:427); 
“ Become one with things when you think, become one with things 
when you act”  (10:158); “ To live is to engage in objective [ego-less] cre­
ation, for our existence is a physical one” ; “ Reality is fluid” ; “ When 
the relative meets the absolute then death must occur. . . .  It is only 
through death that our ego can come, through inverse correspondence 
(gyaku laid), into contact with God”  (11:396).
Although such comments can be rather enigmatic in the full context 
of Nishida thought, the flash of light they provide momentarily illu­
mines not only the direction and nature of the overall discussion but 
the very reality of the reader who is willing to share Nishida’s quest.
Nishida, as mentioned above, produced writings other than his 
philosophical treatises. There are light essays like “ The Background of 
Goethe” (Geete no haike) and “ The Beauty of Calligraphy” (Sho no 
bi}\ reminiscences like “ Old Texts in Kanazawa during the Early Meiji 
Period”  (Meiji no hajimegoro, Kanazawa no kohon) and “ When I 
First Studied under HOjO Sensei”  (HOjQ sensei ni hajimete oshie o uke- 
ta koro)\ plus diaries, letters, and poems in Chinese and Japanese. As 
we noted, these works are all marked by clarity, economy, refinement, 
and substance (qualities that are all the more striking in contrast to the 
laborious nature of his treatises). In them something direct and frank is 
quite fluently expressed. As the exigencies of the occasion demanded 
they were sometimes warm and sometimes cool; sometimes light and 
sometimes profound; sometimes friendly and sometimes severe; and 
sometimes informed by sorrow. One feels upon reading each individual 
piece that one has been handed something unobtrusive but of fun­
damental significance, something possessed of a highly tempered sim­
plicity and naturalness.
And one senses, finally, that what Nishida’s treatises are attempting 
to convey is no different than what these other works are saying. Both 
aspects of Nishida’s writing—the clear, plain wording of his more infor­
mal work and the often belabored language of his philosophical stud­
ies—emerge, I am convinced, from the same fundamental place. “ The
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profoundest philosophy,”  he writes, “ is born when we grasp most 
deeply the meaning of ordinary, everyday life” (14:267-68). His trea­
tises represented his thoroughgoing investigations of these common­
place issues, while his essays and diaries formed the simple, straight­
forward expression of an everyday life in which the complexities had 
resolved themselves to reveal a transparent profundity.
For the philosopher, philosophy is “ the only thing that is truly neces­
sary.” Yet even for the philosopher the final, ultimate issues are the 
question of life and the question of death. Living with personal suffer­
ing, family distress, and the various historical trials of his time, Nishi- 
da continued both his questioning and his writing till the moment of 
his death. He once asked himself, “ What pleasure is there in life?” His 
simple answer was, “ To breathe is one such pleasure” (13:439), adding 
that “ ultimately speaking, [the greatest pleasure] is to be content with 
everyday life” 2 (11:452). “ I love the sea,” he wrote, “ I feel something 
infinite at work there” (12:173).
There is a fundamental inquiry that informs the entirety of Nishida’s 
life and work: “ What is this self of ours? And what is this world of real­
ity in which we are born, in which we work, and in which we die?” 
This inquiry has two aspects that are questioned as one: “ this self of 
ours” (that is, the self of “ I and thou,” of self and self, of the infinite 
“ monads that exist only in relation to other monads” ) and “ this 
world” in which we exist. The world in question here is the world of 
reality, composed of a complex layering and fusion of the world of sam- 
sara (“ this world in which we are born and in which we die” ), the 
world of everyday existence (“ this world in which we are born and in 
which we work” ), and the historical world in which West encounters 
East, North faces South, ethnic groups clash, and great nations rise 
and fall. If we take Nishida’s inquiry—an inquiry issuing from depths 
of the world of suffering—and accept it as his legacy to us, then we too 
may find our thinking “ confused and jumbled” as we strive to deal 
with these nearly insoluble problems. But perhaps we can do so with 
the anticipation of finding a certain contentment (Gelassenheit).
Translated by Thomas L. Kirchner
2 A rather inadequate rendering o f the term byOjOtei, which indicates that the truth 
is replete in everyday life just as it is.
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